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Summary findings
Policymakers sometimes presume that adopting a less
The potential for inefficiency stems from two polluting technology necessarily improves welfare. This problems with the Pigouvian rule. First, the Pigouvian view is generally mistaken. Adopting a cleaner price does not discriminate against each unit of emissions technology is costly, and this cost must be weighed according to its marginal damage. Second, full ratcheting against the technology's benefits in reduced pollution of the emissions price in response to declining marginal and reduced abatement costs.
damage as firms adopt the cleaner technology is correct The literature to date has not satisfactorily examined ex post but distorts incentives for adopting technology ex whether emissions pricing properly internalizes this ante. tradeoff between costs and benefits. And if the trend
The next natural step for research is to examine toward greater use of economic instruments in second-best pricing policies or multiple instrument environmental policy continues, as is likely, the policies. The challenge is to design regulatory policies properties of those instruments must be understood, that go some way toward resolving p.oblems yet are especially for dynamic efficiency.
geared to implementation in real regulatory settings.
Kennedy and Laplante examine incentives for adopting
Clearly, such policies must use more instruments than cleaner technologies in response to Pigouvian emissions emissions pricing alone. Direct taxes or subsidies for pricing in equilibrium (unlike earlier analyses, which they technological change, together with emissions pricing, contend, have been generally incomplete and at times should give regulators more scope for creating misleading).
appropriate dynamic incentives. Such instruments are Their results indicate that emissions pricing under the already widely used: investment tax credits (for standard Pigouvian rule leads to efficient equilibrium environmental research and development), accelerated adoption of technology only under certain circumdepreciation (for pollution control equipment), and stances. They show that the equilibrium level of adopting environmental funds (to subsidize the adoption of a public innovation is efficient under Pigouvian pricing pollution control equipment). only if there are enough firms that each firm has a Such direct incentives could be excessive, however, if negligible effect on aggregate emissions. When those emissions pricing is already in place. Ail incentives circumstances are not satisfied, Pigouvian pricing does should be coordinated. not induce an efficient (social welfare-maximizing) level of innovation. This paper -a product of the Environment, Infrastructure, and Agriculture Division, Policy Research Department -is part of a larger effort in the department to promote clearer understanding of important environmental policy issues. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please contact Elizabeth Schaper, room N10-021, telephone 202-473-3457, fax 202-522-3230, Internet address eschaper@worldbank.org (40 pages). August 1995. EXECUTIVE SUMMMARY This paper examines incentives for cleaner technology adoption in response to Pigouvian emissions pricing. There is sometimes a presumption among policy-makers that the adoption of a less polluting technology necessarily improves social welfare. This view is generally mistaken. The innovation and adoption of a cleaner technology is costly, and this cost must be weighed against the benefits of the new technology, in the form of reduced pollution and reduced abatement costs. Wlhether or not emissions pricing properly internalizes this tradeoff between the costs and benefits of technological change is a question that has not been addressed satisfactorily in the literature to date. We believe it is important to fill that gap. If the current trend towards greater use of economic instruments in environmnental policy continues (and there is every reason to believe that it Nvill), then it is crucial that the properties of those instruments be understood fully, especially as they pertain to the question of dynamic efficiency. Our attention to incentives in equilibrium distinguishes our analvsis from existing work in this area, which has generally been incomplete and at times misleading.
Our results indicate that emissions pricing according to the standard Pigouvian rule leads to efficient equilibrium technology adoption only under some specific circumstances. We characterize those circumstances in terms of the number of polluting firms and whether or not marginal damage is increasing in aggregate emissions. In particular, we show that if the number of firms is sufficiently large that each firm hias negligible effect on aggregate emissions, then the equiiibrium level of adoption of a public innovation is efficient under Pigouvian pricing. Wihen those circumstances are not satisfied, Pigouvian pricing does not induce the efficient (social welfare maximising) level of innovation. The potential for inefficiency sterns from two distinct problems associated with the Pigouvian rule. The first relates to the fact that the Pigouvian price does not discriminate across each unit of emissions according to its marginal damage. Tlhe second problem relates to the ratcheting of the cmissions price in response to declining marginal damage as firms adopt the cleaner technology. Full ratcheting according to the Pigouvian rule ensures that he emissions price is correct ex post but distorts incentives for technology adoption ex ainte.
We have not examined second-best pricing policies or multiple instrument policies in this paper. To do so is the natural next step in this avenue of research. The challenge is to design regulatory policies that go somne way towards resolving the problems we have highlighted hut at the same time are geared towards implementation in real regulatory settings. It seems clear that such policies will need to use more instruments than emissions pricing alone. In particular. direct taxes or subsidies applied to technological change, used in concert with emissions pricing, are likely to give regulators greater scope in creating appropriate dynamic incentives. Such instruments are alreadv in widespread use, usually in the forrm of investment tax credits (for environmental R&D). accelerated depreciation provisions (for pollution control equipment), and the creation of environmental funds (for subsidizing the adoption of pollution control equipment). Our results suggest that these direct incentives for 1.
Introduction
One of the most important contributions of economic analysis to environmental policy has been to demonstrate the potential advantages of incentive-based regulation over "command and control". It is now well recognized that economic instruments that attach a price to emissions, such as emission charges and tradeable emission permits, can in many circumstances out-perform traditional command and control policies that simply dictate what individual firms can and cannot do. Economic instruments have the potential to implement environmental quality targets at lower cost and with fewer informational requirements than command and control policies.j Perhaps most important of all, economic instruments create dynamic incentives for technological change. Conmmand and control policies that simply penalize a firn for non-compliance with a specified standard provide no incentive for that firm to employ cleaner production techniques beyond the point at which the regulatory constraint no longer binds. In contrast, policy instruments that attach a price to every unit of emissions provide firms with an ongoing incentive to reduce their emissions through the adoption of new technology if this can be achieved at a cost lower than the price they are paying to emit.
However, dynamic efficiency requires that emissions pricing do more than simply create ongoing incentives for technological change. It must create the right incentives.
There is sometimes a presumption among policy-makers that the adoption of a less I See Bohm and Russell (1985) , Cropper and Oates (1992) , and Tietenberg (1991) for further discussion on the advantages of incentive-based instruments.
polluting technology necessarily improves social welfare. This view is generally mistaken. The innovation and adoption of a cleaner technology is costly, and this cost must be weighed against the benefits of the new technology, in the form of reduced pollution and reduced abatement costs. Whether or not emissions pricing properly internalizes this tradeoff between the costs and benefits of technological change is a question that has not been addressed satisfactorily in the literature to date. We believe it is important to fill that gap. If the current trend towards greater use of economic instruments in environmental policy continues (and there is every reason to believe that it will), then it is crucial that the properties of those instruments be understood fully, especially as they pertain to the question of dynamic efficiency. The purpose of this paper is to provide a systematic analysis of the circumstances under which emissions pricing does and does not create efficient incentives for technological change.
There already exists an extensive literature on incentives for technological change under environmental regulation, but an analysis of the type we provide in this paper is surprisingly absent from that literature.
2 The papers most closely related to our own are those by Downing and White (1986), and Milliman and Prince (1989) . Both of these papers examine the incentives for technological change under emissions pricing. We devote section 5 of our paper to relating our work to these papers. At this point we wish to note only that the main shortcoming of these papers is that they fail to consider 2 See Milliman and Prince (1989) for a survey of literature previous to their paper. More recent work includes Biglaiser and Horowitz (1994) , Laffont and Tirole (1994) , Requate (1994) reason to expect that the dynamic incentives induced by emissions pricing will properly balance the full costs and benefits associated with technology adoption. Only a pricing rule based on damage can hope to achieve that goal. We confine our attention to the Pigouvian rule since it is the theoretical ideal in setting emission prices to induce static efficiency. Our paper asks whether, and under what conditions, the Pigouvian rule also induces dynamic efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we construct a simple model that provides the basis for our analysis. In section 3 we examine the adoption of a public innovation (for which no license fee is payable). We consider this case to highlight 3
We comment on the appropriateness of this particular equilibrium concept in section 6. some important results that become less transparent when complicated by the introduction of a patent holder. We consider the patented innovation case in section 4. In section 5 we relate our results to the existing literature. We provide a brief summary of our results and some thoughts on directions for future research in section 6.
The Model
Time is divided into two periods. In period 0 all firms use a production technology with associated abatement cost MACO(e) defined over their emissions e. 4
This schedule is illustrated in Figure 1 . In the absence of emissions pricing, a firn will undertake no abatement and will produce emissions e where MAC,(e) = 0. We assume that marginal abatement cost is increasing in abatement. Equivalently, MACo (e) < 0. In period I a cleaner technology becomes available with associated marginal abatement cost MACI(e). This is also illustrated in Figure 1 . We assume that MACI(e) is strictly lower than MACO(e) for all positive levels of abatementri The new technology can be adopted by any firm at some fixed cost A. This represents the real cost of manufacturing and installing the new equipment. We assume constant returns to scale in both of these processes. In addition, adopting firms may also have to pay a license fee F to the innovator. We assume that the innovator is a firm outside the polluting industry. This is consistent with real economies in which new technologies are to an ever increasing
The assumption that firms are initially homogeneous is deliberate. The reason will soon become clear.
s
We have chosen to focus on this case because it allows us to present our main insights in the clearest way possible and because it ensures that our analytical structure is directly comparable to those used in the existing literature. degree developed by specialist technology firns and then licensed to polluting firms.
There are n polluting firms in each period. 6 We assume that private and social marginal abatement costs coincide. This implies that polluting firms are price-takers on the product market. It is important to note that this assumption can hold even if the number of polluting firms in the regulated region is small. The regulated firms do not necessarily constitute the whole industry. Such is the case, for example, when polluting domestic firms take world market prices as given.
While it may be interesting to consider the case where firms have some price-setting power, we do not do so here. Our purpose is to examine technology adoption equilibria in response to emissions pricing in the most transparent setting possible. This requires that we abstract from distortions induced by market failures elsewhere. 7 Marginal environmental damage is a function of aggregate emissions E and is denoted MD(E). We make the standard assumption that MD'(E) > 0. The regulator sets the price of emissions (either directly through a charge or indirectly through the supply of tradeable permits) according to the standard Pigouvian rule. This means that in period zero the price of emissions is set equal to po =_ MD(Eo), where E; is the optimal level of 6 We abstract from the possibility of entry in the post-innovation period to ensure, once again, that our analysis is directly comparable to the existing literature.
?
It is well-known that imperfect competition in the product market calls for the distortion of the standard Pigouvian pricing rule [Buchanan (1969) , Lee (1975) , Bamett (1980) ]. Such a distortion will in tum distort technology adoption decisions induced by emissions pricing. aggregate emissions in period 0 given by the standard condition equating marginal damage with marginal abatement cost for each firm:8
(1)
We assume that the regulator continues to apply the Pigouvian pricing rule in period 1.
This means that the price of emissions is adjusted to take account of the reduced marginal abatement costs for firms that adopt the new technology. This policy adjustment is called ratcheting. The adjusted price is set as follows. Let a denote the fraction of firms that adopt the new technology, and let e 1 , and eIo denote, respectively, the emissions in period I for a firm that adopts the new technology and a firm that retains the old technology.
Then the Pigouvian rule requires that the price of emissions in period 1, p;, be set equal to MD (E,) , where E, is the optimal level of emissions in period I given that a fraction Cc of the firms have adopted the new technology. This optimal level of emissions is determined by the equality of marginal damage and marginal abatement cost equalized across firms: (2) MD(E')= MACI(e 1 )= MAC,(e 0 )
where
It is clear that p, < pO when a > 0 since MACI(e) < MACO(e) at any given level of emissions below e. Firms will rationally expect the regulator to ratchet the emissions price in this way unless the regulator can commit to an announced alternative rule. In section 4 we explain why the regulator might like to be able to commit to an alternative rule despite the fact that the Pigouvian rule is efficient ex post.
A Public Innovation
We begin our analysis by supposing that the innovation is public and so can be adopted without the payment of a license fee. We present this case mainly for pedagogical reasons. It is well known that knowledge, once created, is a public good and efficiency ex post requires that all agents have access to it regardless of their willingness to pay. But in order to create ex ante incentives for the creation of the new knowledge, it is necessary to price it ex post, and this will generally exclude some potential beneficiaries. Limited patents and copyrights are designed to trade-off these conflicting objectives. We wish to abstract initially from this standard problem in order to focus on the elements of the issue that are peculiar to the environmental setting. In section 4 we examine the case where the innovation is patented.
In this section, we consider first the case where the number of firms is sufficiently large that each firm has negligible impact on aggregate emissions. We then turn to the case where the number of firms is small and firms act strategically in their technology adoption decisions.
When the number of firms is large
We begin by deriving the efficient level of adoption as the solution to a planning problem. We then compare this efficient solution to the rational expectations equilibrium outcome. optimal. In this second case, the md(e) schedule in Figure 2 will not shift down as the aggregate level of emissions falls. The optimal solution will then involve either cc = I or a = 0 according to whether or not the gain from adoption by any firm is greater than or less than A. Thus, MD'(E) > 0 is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for optimal partial adoption.
To gain further insights, we need to be somewhat more formal. Let C(ca) be the sum of abatement cost, damage and adoption costs when a fraction a of firms adopt the new technology, and emissions from adopting and non-adopting firms are set optimally using the Pigouvian pricing rule. That is,
C(a) = na fMACj (e)de+ n(_a) JMACO(e)de+ JMD(E)dE±+anA Allowing for the possibility that the first-best value of an is not an integer complicates the analysis but does not provide any additional insights. We therefore maintain the integer assumption throughout. '° The second-order conditions for a minimum are satisfied by our assumptions that MAC'(e) > 0 and MD'(E) 2 0. magnitude of the innovation. As noted earlier, if A = 0, universal adoption is always optimal.
EquilibrLium
We now turn to the equilibrium level of adoption. We confine consideration to a rational expectations equilibrium in which each firm correctly anticipates that the price of emissions in period I will be set according to the Pigouvian rule based on the fraction a of firms that adopt the new technology. In the case where n is large, each firm takes that fraction as given and independent of its own adoption decision. This means that each firm views the price of emissions in period I as independent of its own adoption decision. If a fraction a of firms adopt the new technology, and the price of emissions is set according to the Pigouvian rule, then the price in period 1 will be and so partial adoption is never an equilibrium in that special case.
Is the rational expectations equilibrium efficient? A comparison of equations (5) and (7) reveals that it is. Recall that p, (a) = MD(E,) when the price of emissions is set according to the Pigouvian rule. Making this substitution for pl(a) in equation (7) point is identical to that for the case where n is large; the condition for efficiency is equation (5).
Now consider the private incentive to adopt the new technology. The private gain from adoption is represented by the shaded area in Figure 5 . This shaded area can be interpreted as follows. If the firm retains the old technology, then it correctly anticipates an emissions price equal to plo (set according to the Pigouvian rule, given that this firm does not adopt the new technology). It would then abate up to em and so incur an abatement cost equal to the area beneath MACo between e o and e . It also incurs the cost of paying a price Plo on its remaining emissions, equal to the area p 10 e; 0 . If instead the firm adopts the new technology (taking the adoption decisions of other firms as given), then marginal damage will fall (along the md(e) schedule) because the firm is "large", and so the firm will correctly anticipate a price of emissions equal to pll < plo. That is, the firm recognizes that its own adoption decision will affect the price of emissions as determined by the Pigouvian rule. The total cost to the firm under the new technology is therefore equal to the area beneath MAC, between e;, and e-, plus the area pl,e;,. The difference between these total costs for the two technologies is the shaded area in Figure   5 .
It is clear from figures 4 and 5 that the private gain to technology adoption exceeds the social gain. Downing and White (1986) derive an analogous result for the case of a single polluting firm. They explain their result correctly as follows. The
Pigouvian pricing rule levies a price equal to the damage on the marginal unit of emissions of all units of emissions. This means that the total payment for a given level of emissions exceeds the total damage associated with those emissions if marginal damage is increasing. Because the private gain from adopting a new technology stems in part from the reduced emission fees payable after adoption, and because this reduction in fees payable exceeds the reduced damage done, the private gain from adoption exceeds the social gain.
It is important to understand that this excessive incentive to adopt the cleaner technology is not due solely to the strategic interaction between the regulator and individual firms. Figure 6 illustrates the perceived private gain from adoption for a mnyopic firm that anticipates no ratcheting of the emissions price in response to its own adoption decision. It takes the emissions price as given in the same way as the "small" firms of the previous sub-section. The perceived private gain in this myopic case is smaller than when the firm anticipates ratcheting but it is nonetheless greater than the true social gain. The source of the problem is not the ratcheting per se. The problem stems from the fact that the Pigouvian pricing rule does not price each unit of emissions at its marginal damage when marginal damage is increasing. There is no associated distortion of the adoption decision when firms are small because marginal damage is effectively constant wvith respect to their emissions even if marginal damage is increasing in aggregate emissions. This is not true when firms are large. A reduction in their emissions does reduce marginal damage and so the reduced tax payments overstates the social gain. This difference is illustrated as the shaded area in Figure 7 . We know that p, 1 (m') < pl 0 (m') when MD'(E) > 0 because adoption of the cleaner technology by one more firm reduces marginal damage, and we know that eo0 <e 1 I(p ) because MAC, (e) < 0. It follows that B(m) > 0. That is, there is a strictly positive private net 12 We continue to assume an integer solution.
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benefit from adoption for at least one more firm beyond the efficient level of adoption.
This means that equilibrium will involve excessive adoption relative to the interior social optimum. We summarize this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If each firm has a significant effect on aggregate emissions and marginal damage is increasing, and the price of emissions is set according to the Pigouvian rule, and the social optimum is an interior and integer one, then too many firms will adopt a public innovation in equilibrium.
We have already noted that the source of this inefficiency is the fact that the savings in emissions fees for the firm exceeds the reduction in damage when the price of emissions is set according to the Pigouvian rule and marginal damage is increasing. This distortion disappears when n is sufficiently large because marginal damage is effectively constant with respect to the emissions of any individual firm.' 3 There may also be no distortion if the social optimum is a corner solution. In particular, if m = n then iii = n, and there is no inefficiency. That is, if the innovation is so significant relative to its adoption cost that it should be adopted by all firms, then it will be adopted by all firms in equilibrium.
Conversely, if efficiency requires that no firms adopt the new technology, then this may also be supported as an equilibrium if the difference between the private gain and the social gain is not too large (which requires that marginal damage for each firm not be too
This can be seen clearly in expression (12): p, 1 (m*) -) plo(mi) as n a:because small firns correctly perceive that their adoption decision will have no effect on the price of emissions, and so e,, (p,,) -e 1 . It follows that B(m') -O0.
19 strongly increasing). In all other cases, there will be excessive adoption of the new technology.
The solution to this problem is in principle straightforward: emissions should be priced according to a discriminating pricing rule that sets the price of each unit of emissions equal to the marginal damage of that unit. This will eliminate the wedge between the private and social gain to technology adoption while at the same time preserving the static efficiency condition that marginal abatement cost and marginal damage be equated at the optimum in each period. However, implementing this ideal solution is likely to be difficult in practice due to the informational requirements involved. We comment further on this problem in section 6.
Equilibrium adoption of a patented innovation
We now suppose that adopting firns must pay a license fee to the patent holder.
The problem for the patent holder iS1 4 (13) maxm(F)F F where F is the license fee, and m(F) is the anticipated number of firms that will choose to adopt the innovation. The patent holder calculates m(F) correctly as the rational expectations equilibrium level of adoption given the license fee. It turns out that the 14 We assume that the patent holder cannot price discriminate across firms when setting the license fee. 20 welfare implications of the license fee depend importantly on whether marginal damage is constant or increasing in aggregate emissions. We consider each case in turn.
Constant marginal damage
When marginal damage is constant, there is no ratcheting of the emissions price in response to technology adoption. This means the private benefit to adoption (B) does not depend on the number of firms that adopt. Hence, the m(F) schedule faced by the patent holder is perfectly elastic. The patent holder will induce universal adoption if it sets F < B, and no adoption if it sets F > B. If B> 0, then the profit-maximizing solution is to set F = B -E where £ is arbitrarily small. This will induce universal adoption and this is efficient because B reflects the true social gain to adoption when MD'(E) = 0. If instead B < 0, then the privately optimal solution is to set F = 0. This will induce no adoption and this too is efficient. There is therefore no distortion of the adoption equilibrium when a license fee is introduced if marginal damage in aggregate emissions is constant. Note that this result holds regardless of whether n is large or small because there is no effective difference between these cases when MD'(E) = 0. We summarize the result as follows.
Proposition 3. If marginal damage in aggregate emissions is constant, and the price of emissions is set according to the Pigouvian rule, then the patent holder sets a license fee that induces the efficient level of technology adoption.
It should be noted that this result relies on the assumption that all firms are identical. If firms are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the innovation then the m(F) schedule will be negatively sloped and the adoption equilibrium will generally be distorted. Such a distortion would reflect the usual ex ante -ex post tradeoff associated with awarding a patent. We have focused deliberately on the homogeneous case so as to highlight the issues that are peculiar to the environmental setting. in particular, in the next sub-section we show that the ex-ante -ex post efficiency tradeoff arises even when firms are homogeneous if marginal damage is increasing in aggregate emissions.
Increasing marginal damage
Recall from section 3. See Biglaiser and Horowitz (1995) for an analysis of this problem in an environmental setting.
They assume MD'(E) = 0 and heterogeneous firns.
The solution to this condition is depicted as fmi in Figure 8 . The LHS of (15) represents the slope of the dashed ray. The RHS of (15) represents the slope of the B(m) schedule.
The dashed ray is orthogonal to the B(m) schedule at the equilibrium. For comparison, the (interior) equilibrium level of adoption for a public innovation is depicted in Figure 8 as m:n. It is clear that fmi < rm. This is as expected: the license fee reduces the net benefit to adoption and leads to less adoption in equilibrium. The only possible exceptions are at the This result reflects the familiar ex post inefficiency associated with the monopoly pricing of a patented innovation. However, it is important to understand that in this environmental setting this result is linked directly to the ratcheting of the emissions price.
The private gain to a firm from adopting the new technology falls as more firms adopt it, because the regulator ratchets down the price of emissions in line with declining marginal damage. This causes the demand curve faced by the patent holder to be negatively sloped even though firms are homogeneous ex ante. The standard monopoly welfare result then applies directly.
Note that if the emissions price is not ratcheted then the B(m) schedule is not declining in m and the m(F) schedule is perfectly elastic. The patent holder would then set F to induce either no adoption or universal adoption (just as in the MD'(E) = 0 case).
Of course this will generally not be an efficient outcome either. The level of technology adoption will generally be wrong, and the emissions price will be too high ex post (unless no adoption happens to be efficient). However, there is no reason to expect that the inefficiency associated with not ratcheting will necessarily be greater than the inefficiency induced by ratcheting. The key problem is that the regulator is faced with the conflicting goals of inducing the right level of technology adoption and setting the correct emissions price ex post. The second-best solution to this dilemma is unlikely to be full ratcheting according to the standard Pigouvian rule, since this puts exclusive emphasis on achieving the correct ex post emissions price. The second-best pricing policy will likely involve partial ratcheting which trades off the competing ex ante and ex post goals in an optimal way. Of course. this requires that the regulator be able to pre-commit to a tax rate that is sub-optimal ex post.
We complete our analysis in this section by examining the case where the number of firms is small. The efficiency properties of the equilibrium induced by full ratcheting in this case are ambiguous. Recall from section 3.2 that the non-discriminating nature of the standard Pigouvian pricing rule tends to induce excessive technology adoption when marginal damage is increasing and the number of firmns is srnall. This effect can potentially offset the tendency towards under-adoption induced by full ratcheting when the technology is patented. The net effect is therefore ambiguous except in the special case where n = 1. In that case, there can never be under-adoption. We have seen from section 3.2 that a single firm will never choose non-adoption of a public innovation if adoption is efficient. The same must be true of a patented adoption. If adoption is efficient, then the firm would choose to adopt if F = 0. The patent holder would then never set a license fee that induces non-adoption since doing so is always less profitable than setting a lower (but still positive) fee that induces adoption.
5.

Relation to existing literature
One purpose of our paper is to clarify and place in context some existing results in the literature. Our discussion here will focus on papers by Downing and White (1986) and Milliman and Prince (1989 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined incentives for cleaner technology adoption in response to Pigouvian emissions pricing. Our attention to equilibrium considerations distinguishes our analysis from existing work in this area. Our principal results are 1 7 Malueg (1989) and Requate (1994) also examine technology adoption under emissions pricing. They too abstract from equilibrium considerations and their results should be interpreted cautiously. Requate (1994) examines properly the equilibrium between firms for a given policy, but still assumes that firms anticipate no policy adjustment in response to technology adoption, even when such adjustment does occur ex post. summarized as propositions I to 4. The main thrust of these results is that emissions pricing according to the standard Pigouvian rule leads to efficient technology adoption only under some circumstances. We have characterized those circumstances in terms of the number of polluting tirms and whether or not marginal damage is increasing in aggregate emissions.
The potential for inefficiency stems from two distinct problems associated with the Pigouvian rule. The first relates to the {act that Pigouvian pricing does not discriminate across each unit of emissions according to its marginal damage. This means that when marginal damage is increasing, the total emission fees paid by "large" firms exceed the damage caused by their emissions. This in turn tends to induce excessive adoption of cleaner technology. The second problem arises when the technology is patented, and relates to the ratcheting of the emission price in response to declining marginal damage as more firms adopt the cleaner technology. Full ratcheting according to the Pigouvian rule ensures that the emissions price is correct ex post but at the same time distorts technology adoption through its impact on the elasticity of the patent holder's demand curve. It is generally not possible to achieve efficient pricing ex post and at the same time create the rights incentives for technology adoption ex ante using a single instrument.
All of our main results are derived in a rational expectations equilibrium context and we should comment on the reasonableness of that equilibrium concept. Rational expectations is a strong behavioral assumption. It places signigicant rationality and informational requirements on1 the regulated firms, requirements that real-world firms probably do not meet. Ideally. we would like to work with a model in which firms are forward-looking but boundedly rational. Unfortunately. inodels of bounded rationality are not vet developed to the point where they can be used to analyze the sort of policy problems we have examined here. One alternative is to assume that firms are completely myopic, as other models in this literature have done. We believe that this is probablv an even poorer approximation to reality than our rational expectations assumption.
Nonetheless, it is worth speculatinig briefly on the sensitivitv of our results to deviations from rational expectations. In general, one would expect that small "mistakes" by firms in their technology adoption decisions are more likely io precipitate long run outcomes with more technology adoption than our equilibrium results indicate rather than less. The reason relates to the sunkness of technology adoption. In the event of a short run disequilibrium outcome with under-adoption (relative to the rational expectations equilibrium), firms can respond with further technology adoption. But the converse may not be true. If technology adoption is sunk then there may he no wav of profitably undoing an adoption decision that is regretted ex post. Thiat is, over-adoption (relative to the rational expectations equilibrium) mav he an cx post equilibrium to the perturbed game if undoing technology adoption decisions is costly.18
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We should stress that these claims are speculative. We have not examined the perturbed game forrnally.
We have not examined second-best pricing policies or multiple instrument policies in this paper. To do so is the natural next step in this avenue of research. The challenge is to design regulatory policies that go some way towards resolving the problems we have highlighted but at the same time are geared towards implementation in real regulatory settings. It seems clear that such policies will need to use more instruments than emissions pricing alone. In particular, direct taxes or subsidies applied to technological change, used in concert with emissions pricing, are likely to give regulators greater scope in creating appropriate dynamic incentives. Such instruments are already in widespread use, usually in the form of investment tax credits (for environmental R&D). accelerated depreciation provisions (for pollution control equipment), and the creation of environmental funds (for subsidizing the adoption of pollution control equipment). 1 9 Our results suggest that these direct incentives for technological change should be used with caution if emissions pricing is already in place;
the incentives so created could in fact be excessive. It is crucial that all instruments in place be properly coordinated in recognition of their inter-related incentive effects.
Further research that provides a clearer understanding of those effects can contribute usefully to the design of real policy. 
